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Ronald Reagan signed a recommendation from the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC)
calling for ￿ve years of new tari⁄s on heavyweight motorcycles in the period from 1983 to 1988. This
tari⁄ relief, called safeguard, was intended to protect against Japanese imports Harley-Davidson
Motor Co., the U.S.￿ s last remaining motorcycle manufacturer. At that time Harley was under
￿nancial distress with merely four percent of the market that it once dominated in the early 1970s.
The new tari⁄s were scheduled to start at 49.4 % of the wholesale price and decrease to 14.4 %
in the ￿fth year, while the Japanese were allowed to ship the ￿rst 6000 cycles under the old 4.4
% tari⁄, and that allowance rose by 1000 units a year. After receiving temporary import relief
in 1983, Harley-Davidson came back stronger than ever. Its sales increased dramatically with the
annual rate of 10 % from 1983 to 1990. Indeed, Harley recovered so swiftly that it even requested
that the ￿nal year of tari⁄ protection be cancelled. The Harley-Davidson motorcycle case is now
heralded as a great success of safeguard protection.
Some, however, hold a skeptical view on the role of import relief in Harley-Davidson￿ s turn-
around. Harley produced mostly heavyweight motorcycles with piston displacement of more than
900 cc in the 1980s. Irwin (2002) argues that, since the motorcycles imported from Japan were
concentrated mostly on medium-weight bikes in the range from 700 to 850 cc, they did not directly
compete with Harley-Davidson. Reid (1990) documents the story that Harley-Davidson saved itself
from bankruptcy primarily because they restored employee commitment, ￿xed its lax inventory sys-
tem, and revolutionized manufacturing processes. In their view, import relief had little to do with
Harley-Davidson￿ s turnaround. As safeguard policy has attracted a renewed attention amongst the
surge of antidumping cases, it is imperative to empirically resolve these con￿ icting views on the
e⁄ectiveness of the most famous safeguard case in U.S. history.
This paper takes an empirical approach to assess the extent to which the U.S. safeguard policy
contributed to Harley-Davidson￿ s recovery. We employ a random coe¢ cient discrete choice model
to estimate motorcycle demand in the U.S. market. The methodology controls for endogeneity of
price, and allows for heterogeneity in consumer tastes. Combined with the estimates of supply-side
model, we conduct counter-factual analyses to assess the e⁄ectiveness of the import relief on Harley-
Davidson implemented in the period from 1983 to 1987. The paper ￿nds that Harley-Davidson￿ s
recovery was not entirely due to the safeguard protection. The simulation exercises reveal that the
temporary protection of the maximum tari⁄s of 45% increased Harley-Davidson￿ s sales and pro￿t
by a mere six percent.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents an overview of the U.S.
motorcycle market, and provides descriptive statistics from our data set. Section 3 introduces a
model to illustrate both consumers transaction behavior and ￿rms pricing behavior of motorcycles in
2the United States. The section also presents estimation procedure and instruments used to control
for endogeneity in motorcycle prices in demand. Based on estimates obtained in Section 4, Section
5 conducts counterfactual exercises to measure the impact of the safeguard policy on American
and Japanese motorcycle revenues. The section demonstrates that the safeguard provided by the
U.S. government until 1987 explains merely a six percent of Harley-Davidson￿ s sales recovery. The
￿nding of this small safeguard e⁄ect on Harley-Davidson revenue is largely due to our estimation
results indicating that the values of cross-price elasticities of consumer demand between American
and Japanese motorcycles are considerably small. Thus, the tari⁄ increases would have had little
e⁄ect on shifting consumers from Japanese motorcycles to Harley-Davidson￿ s. Our estimation
results support the hypothesis that Harley-Davidson saved themselves out of bankruptcy. It should
be taken as coincidence that Harley-Davidson recovered its pro￿t when they received the import
relief. Section 6 concludes, followed by data appendix.
2 Overview of the U.S. Motorcycle Market
Harley-Davidson had traditionally been the leader in the U.S. motorcycle market during the 1950s.
The situation changed, however, with the entrance of Japanese motorcycle manufacturers. The new
entrants sold only motorcycles of 250 cc￿ s or less in the 1960s. These lightweight bikes quickly gained
a reputation for high quality and advanced technology. By 1965, the U.S. market was dominated
by lightweight motorcycles, with Honda controlling 85 % of the market. Indeed, Honda￿ s sales leapt
from $500,000 in 1960 to $77 million by 1965. Initially, this dramatic shift in the market was not
perceived as a threat by Harley, the sole surviving American-owned motorcycle ￿rm; since their
territory of heavyweight motorcycles was left uninvaded and the market was expanding. However,
when the lightweight market was successfully under their control, the Japanese producers ventured
to the market with larger engine capacities, thereby competing directly with Harley-Davidson in the
United States. Japanese launch of heavyweight bikes grew intense as Kawasaki and Honda opened
plants in Nebraska in 1974 and Ohio in 1979 respectively, to produce heavyweight motorcycles. By
the end of 1981, Harley-Davidson fell down to a distant ￿fth with a mere ￿ve percent of the U.S.
motorcycle market, following Honda (38 %), Yamaha (25 %), Kawasaki (16 %), and Suzuki (14 %).
The remaining share attributed primarily to BMW.
Harley-Davidson has long attributed its declining sales to lower priced Japanese imports. Sharp
increases in the Japanese import in the early 1980s, along with the 1981 and 1982 recession,
accumulated a large stockpile of inventory for both the American and Japanese companies. As a
result, Harley-Davidson sought tari⁄ protection in 1982, claiming that the inventories caused by
the substantial increases in Japanese imports created the threat of serious injury to the American
company. The Regan administration accepted the ITC￿ s recommendation and adopted a tari⁄-rate
3quota on imports on motorcycles over 700cc from April 1983 to March 1988. The tari⁄-rate quota
allows the certain amount of motorcycles to be imported under the normal tari⁄rate of 4.4 percent,
and imports above that quantity have to pay the higher protective tari⁄s. The quotas in 1983 were
set at 6000 units for Japan, 5000 units for West Germany (where BMW was located), and 4000
units for imports from all other countries. These levels were scheduled to increase each year of the
relief period. The new tari⁄ rates were set at 49.4 percent for the initial year, declined over the
￿ve years, and then returned to the normal tari⁄ rate.
As indicated in Figure 2, U.S. import quantities of larger motorcycles that Harley sought for
protection dropped by half, when the highest tari⁄ was implemented in 1983. Interestingly, they
continued to decline in the safeguard period as the tari⁄-rate quota eased toward 1988. While the
declined units of imported motorcycles are largely due to the decrease in U.S. motorcycle sales in
this period, two other events may also account for this observation. The one is that the Japanese
may have exported more motorcycles with smaller engine displacement, so that they could evade
the tari⁄-rate quota and imported under the normal duty. Table 2 presents U.S. motorcycle sales
of Harley-Davidson and the Japanese by engine displacement size. The data are from R. L. Polk,
achieved in the U.S. Library of Congress, and the availability is limited in the period from 1983
to 1987. The table indicates that Japanese manufacturers indeed appear to have responded to the
safeguard action; the sales shares of Japanese motorcycles with 699 or less jumped from 43 percent
to more than 60 percent in 1983 and thereafter. The increase in sales was mostly substituted from
the decrease in sales of Japanese medium-size motorcycles in the range from 700 to 1099 cc while
the overall Japanese sales declined. The change in the sales composition by engine displacement
would not be entirely accounted for by motorcycle prices, provided by the fact that average prices
of Japanese medium-sized motorcycles dropped more than that of the smaller-sized.
The other event that may have contributed to the decrease in US imports is that, since the
higher tari⁄s were not applied to domestic production, the foreign producers, namely Honda and
Kawasaki, would have gradually shifted their production to the United States.1 Though no data
are publicly available on local production made by the Japanese companies, we take into account
possible e⁄ects of local production in our empirical assessment of the motorcycle safeguard.
The tari⁄-rate quota a⁄ected not only on quantities of imports and sales, but also on motorcycle
prices. Figure 2 shows the prime retail prices averaged over Harley-Davidson and the Japanese
motorcycle makes. The prime retail prices are known to closely re￿ ect transaction prices, and
thus di⁄er from manufacturer￿ s suggested prices. The data are available from National Automotive
Dealers Association (NADA) in the period from 1977 to 1987. The price data in the ￿gure are
in constant 1983 U.S. dollars, and weighted by quantities sold in each year. A observation worth
1Daily Automobile Newspaper, July 1985.
4noting is that the prices of the Japanese motorcycles subject to higher tari⁄s did not increase in the
￿rst two years into the safeguard period. In fact, Harley-Davidson￿ s prices maintained 70 % higher
and increased at the rate three times faster than the Japanese counterpart. This observation might
have been accounted for by the aftermath of large inventories accumulated by the Japanese in 1981
and 1982, as mentioned earlier in this section. According to the USITC (1984), the inventory at the
beginning of 1983 took more than 20 percent of the U.S. motorcycle sales of that year. Since most of
the inventory were motorcycles with 700 cc or greater, this supply glut would have had larger impact
on Japanese motorcycles of that category. The Japanese prices began to increase in 1985 when
the Plaza Accord was signed. Prices of Japanese motorcycles for both size categories increased
with the devaluation of U.S. dollar; the rate of price increase was on average 10 percent, more
than 50 percent faster than that of Harley-Davidson￿ s. This observation witnesses that Japanese
motorcycle prices in the 1980s were accounted for largely by imports, and probably less by local
production made by Honda and Kawasaki.
To examine the safeguard e⁄ect on the prime retail prices, pmt, for motorcycle model m and
period t, we perform the following estimating regression in the period from 1977 to 1987:




where SG is the safeguard variable, which takes 1 if model m is Japanese make with engine dis-
placement of 700 cc or larger, and 0 otherwise. While some motorcycles that receive SG equal one
must have been manufactured in the U.S, the data set is unable to distinguish imported motorcycles
from locally produced ones. Thus, the coe¢ cient of this variable would underestimate the e⁄ect of
the safeguard policy. The control group that identi￿es the SG coe¢ cient includes both Japanese
motorcycles with the smaller engine displacement, and Harley-Davidson￿ s. The period dummy TD
captures aggregate factors that a⁄ect p over time in the same way for all the motorcycle models
in the study period. It takes 1 if the model m was sold in the period from 1983 to 1987, and 0 if
outside of the safeguard period. In an alternative speci￿cation, we de￿ne TD as the variable that
takes 1 if the vintage year of the model m was in the safeguard period, and 0 otherwise. Note that
as discussed shortly below, since the age variable is in the regression, the year and vintage year
variables in principle cannot be used simultaneously.
The other variables that may have in￿ uenced the motorcycle prices are included in the ￿fth term
of the LHS, whose k-th element is denoted by Zmkt. Motorcycle and industry characteristics are
incorporated in this term. For motorcycle characteristics, we use the variables of engine displace-
ment, and dry weight (that is, the motorcycle weight with empty oil tank), both in a logarithmic
form. Model age variable is also included to separate the e⁄ects of new and older motorcycles. For
industry characteristics, we use the variables of exchange rate (US$ / Japanese Yen, in logarithm),
5trend variable, and the interaction term composed of the trend variable, and the Harley-Davidson
dummy that takes 1 if the model m is manufactured by Harley-Davidson, and 0 otherwise. The
imported motorcycle prices would have been in￿ uenced by the exchange rate between American and
Japanese currencies. The coe¢ cient of the variable re￿ ects the extent to which the exchange rate
passed through the retail transaction prices of motorcycles during the study period. We include a
di⁄erent trend term for Harley-Davidson, to control for unobserved di⁄erences between domestic
and foreign-make motorcycles. Finally, the regression model includes the constant term, and the
error term, ￿.
Table 2 presents estimation results. The ￿rst column (1-A) is based on the speci￿cation where
the year dummy variable is used for TD, and the second column (2-A) is where the vintage-
year dummy is used. The estimation ￿nds that both speci￿cations ￿t the data well, and most
parameter estimates are precisely estimated. The coe¢ cient of interest, ￿2, captures the impact
of the safeguard policy on motorcycle prices. The estimates of ￿2 indicate that the introduction
of the safeguard tari⁄s increased the motorcycle retail prices by the magnitudes ranging from 2.2
(found in 1-A) to 10.3 percent (in 2-A). In view of the fact that the safeguard tari⁄ rates spanned
from 15 to 45 percent, the tari⁄s did not fully penetrated to the domestic prices. This ￿nding is
consistent with the estimated coe¢ cient on exchange rate, indicating incomplete pass-through of
11-13 percent. Our estimates of the pass-through rate appear much smaller than those reported in
other existing studies (surveyed in, for example, Goldberg and Knettle, 2000); however, note that
our analysis of retail prices is not directly comparable to unit values often used to examine in the
previous work.
The coe¢ cients of the dry-weight and engine displacement variables are estimated signi￿cantly
positive. A one-percent increase in dryweight would increase the motorcycle retail price by 0.54
percent. The estimated engine-displacement coe¢ cient indicates that the price of Harley-Davidson￿ s
largest model with 1340 cc more than doubled the price of the Japanese 450cc motorcycles. The
rate of obsolescence, calculated from the estimated age coe¢ cient, is more than 12 percent.
Combining the ￿ndings made in Figure 1 and Table 1, we found that Harley-Davidson experi-
enced the increases in both prices and sales quantities in the safeguard period. In the meantime,
the Japanese companies had their prices increased at much a slower rate than Harley-Davidson,
and their sales quantities substantially decreased in 1983 and thereafter. These market-level data
witness that Harley-Davidson￿ s recovery was not entirely due to the import relief, because motor-
cycle prices do not appear to play a major role in Harley-Davidson￿ s sales expansion. It is rather
natural to think that non-price elements in Harley-Davidson￿ s motorcycles, quality and reliabil-
ity for example, may have had accounted more for the recovery. Indeed, it was around 1983 that
Harley-Davidson renovated their production system. They implemented a statistical control system
6that prompted employees to judge the quality of their own output, and a just-in-time inventory pro-
gram that improved their production e¢ ciency, along with massive layo⁄s that led their workforce
to half. As a result, Harley-Davidson downshifted the percentage of defective bikes from about
50 % to less than 2 % (Advertising Age, August 10, 1987: S-27). They also created a new engine
￿ ￿evolution￿￿ which were more reliable than their old V-twin engine. Reid (1990) documents
that the introduction of this new engine turned out successful in expanding the sale of large mo-
torcycles, particularly with the piston displacement of 1380 cc, the Harley￿ s best-selling motorcycle
category.
The analyses in this section highlight that, in order to obtain an insight on the Harley Davidson￿ s
turnaround, we need to understand the demand structure of the U.S. motorcycle market: what
economic factors drove consumers to Harley Davidson, instead of Japanese motorcycles, regardless
of the price di⁄erences observed in Figure 2. In the next section, we examine consumers￿transaction
behavior on motorcycles.
3 Model for the U.S. Motorcycle Market
This section describes an estimation model we use to explain the new motorcycle market in the
United States. We ￿rst introduce a demand system, derived from a random-coe¢ cient discrete
choice model of consumer behavior. We estimate demand for new motorcycles at the model level,
incorporating important dimensions of motorcycle attributes. Since we do not observe the individ-
ual purchasing behavior, we aggregate across individual buyers to obtain the demand for a motor-
cycle model, while still allowing for heterogeneity across consumers. We then describe oligopolistic
pricing behavior of American and Japanese motorcycle companies. We base our estimation on the
di⁄erentiated-product Bertrand oligopoly model. We ￿nally describe our estimation strategy.2
3.1 Discrete Choice Model
This section describes a random-coe¢ cient discrete choice model of motorcycle demand. In any
particular year, we take the motorcycle owner with 450cc or larger as the purchasing entity, where
each owner has a unit demand for a new motorcycle model. Though this is not an accurate
description of the potential buyers, di⁄erent de￿nitions of the market size would not in￿ uence our
estimation results reported in Section 5.3 The second-hand market was known as not of a negligible
size in the study period. Though data are unavailable to us, we try to control for the existence of
the second-hand market in the estimation model described below.
2We also investigate the robustness of our results to alternative speci￿cations of ￿rm pricing behavior.
3Di⁄erent di¢ nitions of the market size include; the set of owners of all the motorcycles, including those with less
than 450 cc as the potential buyers; and the set of all U.S. households.
7Each consumer i is assumed to maximize the following indirect utility function at time t by
choosing motorcycle model j among Jt+1 alternatives, one of which is the option of not purchasing
a motorcycle:
uijt = xjt￿ + ￿jt +
X
k
￿kxjkt￿ik + ￿ipjt + ￿ijt; (1)
where uij is consumer i￿ s utility from consuming the model j. The vector xj is motorcycle model
j￿ s observed attributes including the constant and trend terms, and tri-annual dummies. The k-th
component of this vector is denoted by xjk. We include in xj three characteristics of motorcycles;
engine displacement, dryweight, and age. The utility function contains, ￿jt, an unobserved (to an




= 0. Note that xjt￿ + ￿jt,
where ￿ is a set of parameters to be estimated, are common to all consumers. This term, denoted
by ￿j, re￿ ects the mean level of utility across consumers who purchase the model j.
To enable richer substitution patterns, we follow Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1999) and allow
di⁄erent consumers to have di⁄erent intensities of preferences for characteristics. We rely on a
random coe¢ cients utility speci￿cation and include the last three terms in the left-hand side of
(1). For each characteristic k, consumer i has a taste ￿ik, which is drawn from an i.i.d. standard
normal distribution. The parameters ￿k capture the variance in consumer tastes. The outside
good in our model, the consequence of not purchasing a motorcycle, includes used motorcycles and
public transport. Although it is not possible to distinguish between changes in the constant term
in (1) and changes in the mean and variance in consumers￿tastes for the outside good, inclusion of
the constant term do allow us to control for possible bias due to the presence of the second-hand
market.
The term ￿i is the consumer i￿ s sensitivity to changes in real price, pj, (in the 1983 constant
USD). Using the idea from Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1999), we assume that the distribution of





where yi is the consumer i￿ s income and ￿ is a parameter to be estimated. Price sensitivity is
modeled as inversely related to income. While we lack data on individual consumer￿ s income, the
income distribution for U.S. motorcycle owners is approximated by the log-normal distribution,
with the mean and variance of the distribution being estmated by the data from the MIC (1985).
4
4The mean and variance of the log-normal distribution for the motorcycle owner income is estimated as 24487 and
15434 (in terms of the 1983 constant USD), respectively.
8The third and forth terms in the LHS of (1) can be considered as the deviation of the mean
utility, and we denote by ￿ij. Let ￿ij represent the idiosyncratic taste of consumer i for product
j, and follow the type I extreme value. This distributional assumption yields consumer i￿ s choice








l=1 exp(￿l + ￿il)
: (3)
The market share of motorcycle model j, denoted by sj, is obtained by taking integrals of sij
over i with the distribution of consumers heterogenous tastes, ￿ik, for all the relevant k￿ s, and
the distribution of consumer￿ s income, yi. Thus, sj is shown as a fraction of the total motorcycle
owners including those who do not purchase a new motorcycle in a particular time.
3.2 Oligopolistic Pricing Model
This section describes the way in which the safeguard tari⁄s would have a⁄ected the motorcycle
prices in the United States. We assume that American and Japanese companies compete over price
in supplying U.S. customers with motorcycles of di⁄erentiated attributes. As indicated in Table
1, each company manufactured more than 25 models in each year. We thus explicitly consider a
multiproduct oligopolistic competition model. Consider that the situation where ￿rm f (= 1;:::;F)
chooses prices over a set of their motorcycles, Jf, in order to maximize its pro￿t. In the model
presented below, we assume away three important elements in the U.S. motorcycle market in the
1980s; the presence of inventory, Japanese local production, and quota that allows for the Japanese
to export to the U.S. at the normal tari⁄ rate. We discuss the implications to our estimates
created by these assumptions later in this section. With the caveat in mind, a solution to ￿rm f￿ s
maximization problem for model j (= 1;:::;Jf) is given by: 5
s(p)(1 + ￿)
























































where p = (p1;:::;pJF)0, s = (s1::::;sJF)0, (1 + ￿)
￿1 = diag( 1
1+￿1::::; 1
1+￿JF
), and mc = (mc1;:::;mcJF)0.
The tari⁄rate of model j is denoted by ￿j, which takes the safeguard tari⁄rates for Japanese motor-
cycles with the 700cc or larger engine displacement, and the normal tari⁄rate of 0.044 for Japanese
5The same technique is used for example in Ohashi (2002; 2003).
9motorcycles with 699cc or less. Obviously it takes zero for Harley-Davidson. The marginal cost of
manufacturing model j, mcj, is assumed to be constant. Entry and exit by models make the size
of B change over time. The ownership matrix is D, in which the (a;b) element takes a value of 1 if
models a and b are marketed by the same ￿rm and 0 otherwise. Note that under the assumption
of collusion, all the models are supposed to be marketed by a single ￿rm.
With demand estimates and the ownership matrix in hand, we are able to recover the marginal-
cost vector, mc, from (4). We then estimate the following cost function;
ln(mcjt) = wjt￿ + !jt;
where wjt includes the variables of engine displacement, and dryweight for model j at time t,
exchange rate (in terms of USD / Japanese Yen) at time t, cumulative output for the company f
that produced model j, along with the trend term and the make dummy variables. The company￿ s
cumulative output represents the e⁄ect of learning by doing, in an attempt to capture the decline
of the marginal cost in response to accumulated experience. We construct the variable by summing
over the number of motorcycles (with 250 cc or larger) produced starting from 1903 for Harley-
Davidson, 1955 for Honda and Yamaha, 1965 for Kawasaki, and 1970 for Suzuki.6 While in principle
the presence of learning by doing makes the ￿rm￿ s dynamic pricing behavior important, we employ
the static framework of oligopolistic competition in that the levels of cumulative output were already
large enough in the beginning of the 1980s.
3.3 Estimation Procedure
The estimation model presented above requires the model-level data on quantities sold, prices and
other physical attributes. Such data are available from R. L. Polk, achieved in the U.S. Library of
Congress, and the availability is limited in the period from 1983 to 1987. The summary statistics
of the data were presented in Table 1.
Following the literature (see, for example, Berry, 1994), we assume that xj and ￿j are not
correlated with one another. This is a central identi￿cation assumption for the demand estimation.
This assumption may not be accurate in that observed characteristics may be positively correlated
with brand image or other attributes that we do not have data for. Nevertheless the assumption
helps greatly by reducing the number of instruments needed in the estimation.
We are concerned that the variable of price may possibly correlated with the error ￿j. It is likely
that the observed characteristics may not cover all the important functions of motorcycles. Indeed,
￿j is often interpreted as the unobserved quality error. If ￿j is correctly perceived by consumers and
6The cumulative output data for the Japanese companies are obtained from Japan Automobile Dealers Association.
Those for Harley-Davidson are from Conner (1996).
10sellers in the market, this unobserved quality error is likely correlated with price: Better-quality
motorcycles may induce higher willingness to pay, and sellers may be able to charge higher prices
due to higher marginal costs, or oligopolistic market power.
In product di⁄erentiation model with exogenous characteristics, the characteristics of other ￿rms
are appropriate instruments. With market power in supply, the markup of each model depends on
the distance from its neighbors in the characteristics space. The characteristics of other products are
thus related to pj, but since characteristics are assumed to be exogenous, they are valid instruments.
We include the set of instruments the sum of characteristics of other motorcycle models owned by
the ￿rm, and that of models o⁄ered by competing ￿rms. They may be negatively correlated with
the price.7
We ￿rst estimate the demand model, and use the obtained estimates to calculate the marginal
cost, by which we estimate the marginal cost function. The demand and marginal cost estimates
are presented in the next section.
4 Estimation Results
This section presents estimation results of the demand and supply equations discussed in the
previous section. Table 4 shows three estimation results from the demand estimation. Speci￿cations
(1) and (2) are based on a logit model, estimating (1) without ￿ij; (1) uses the ordinary least squared
method, whereas (2) uses the instruments discussed in the previous section to control for possible
endogeneity of motorcycle prices. Speci￿cation (3) estimates the full model of (1).
Speci￿cation (1) does not ￿t the data well. The price coe¢ cient is neither economically and
statistically insigni￿cant. While many coe¢ cients are estimated signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero,
we are concerned that endogeneity in prices may lead to a correlation between the price and the
unobserved error. If the price is responsive to the unobserved quality, the resulting bias in the
price coe¢ cient could be severe. The IV estimator reported in (2) accounts for this bias. The price
estimate indicates the successful elimination of the endogeneity in the positive correlation with the
unobserved quality.
The estimated coe¢ cient of engine displacement is not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero, indi-
cating that consumers do not appear to care for the size of engine displacement in the choice of
motorcycle model. If unmeasured quality presumably makes certain models survive in the market,
the age coe¢ cient may capture this unmeasured quality di⁄erence among the surviving models.
Being conditioned by ￿j, the age coe¢ cient may be appropriately interpreted as a rate of obsoles-
cence. The estimated coe¢ cient indicates that the one-more year of obsolescence is worth 114 USD
7The same set of instruments are used by Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1999) and Petrin (2002), among others.
11(in terms of the 1983 constant price), approximately three percent of the average motorcycle price
in the study period. The coe¢ cients of the period dummy variables indicate that summer is high
season and winter is low. The estimated coe¢ cients of the industry and Harley-Davidson￿ s trend
variables re￿ ect the information shown in Figure 1: The U.S. motorcycle sales declined and the
Harley-Davidson￿ s expanded in the period of 1983 to 1987.
Speci￿cation (3) reports the estimates from the random-coe¢ cients demand model, derived from
(1). We allow for the variables of engine displacement, dryweight, and constant to have the random
coe¢ cients. Based on the ￿nding of endogenous price coe¢ cient in (1), we apply the instruments
on this speci￿cation in the same way as we did on (2). The estimated mean coe¢ cients take similar
values to those found in (2).
Dryweight is a major characteristic of motorcycle: it represents the degree of stability in riding.
The high signi￿cance in the estimated mean coe¢ cient appears to re￿ ect the consumers￿perception
on dryweight. The variable can also serve as a proxy for luxuriousness of motorcycle equipment,
such as the confortableness of seats. Although consumers perception on dryweight might have
di⁄ered, the random coe¢ cient on dryweight does not capture such heterogeneity.
It is interesting to note that the coe¢ cient of engine displacement is estimated statistically
insigni￿cant in the mean, but signi￿cant in the standard deviation. The estimates might indicate
that the average consumer did not value motorcycles with larger engine sizes, but that individual
consumers had di⁄erent tastes on di⁄erent sizes of engine displacement. The latter ￿nding seems to
make sense for consumer purchase on motorcycles; some consumers buy heavyweight motorcycles
intended for a long trip, and others prefer medium-sized motorcycles for scurrying inside the city.
The random coe¢ cient on the constant term may imply consumers￿heterogenous responses to
the outside good; di⁄erent individual owners have di⁄erent demand for new motorcycles, perhaps
because of the condition of used-motorcycles market.
Using the obtained demand estimates, we present average values of estimated own- and cross-
price semi-elasticities. Semi-elasticity is de￿ned as the percentage change in market share of mo-
torcycle in the row associated with a $100 increase in the price of the column motorcycle. We
calculated the value of semi-elasticity between a pair of all the motorcycle models covered in our
data set, and calculate for each entry of the table the average of the values using the model-sales
share as a weight. The table indicates that the averaged own semi-elasticity of Japanese motor-
cycle models is 40 percent higher in the absolute value than that of Harley-Davidson. In general,
cross-price elasticities are larger for motorcycles with similar sizes of engine displacement. Note
that Harley-Davidson made its sales mostly from motorcycles with 1100 cc or above.
Table 5 presents the estimation result. We use the estimates when simulating the e⁄ects of
safeguard tari⁄s in the next section. Though not shown in the table, the result changes little
12when we include the quadratic terms of the explanatory variables. Most of the parameters are
precisely estimated. The estimated coe¢ cient of learning by doing indicates that one-percent
increase in cumulative output decreases the marginal cost of motorcycle production by 7 percent.
The interaction term of the trend and the Harley-Davidson dummy variables might imply that the
production e¢ ciency of Harley-Davidson improved during the study period.
5 Simulating the E⁄ect of Safeguard
Did the import relief implemented in the period from 1983 to 1987 resuscitate Harley-Davidson out
of the brink of bankruptcy? Or Harley-Davidson saved themselves by their managerial e⁄orts? In
this section, we explore the extent to which the safeguard tari⁄s on motorcycle imports of engine
displacement of 690cc or above contributed to the increase Harley-Davidson￿ s sales and pro￿t.
We conduct a following experiment to assess the e⁄ectiveness of the safeguard policy, leaving
such long-run e⁄ects as product mix constant. For the period of 1983 to 1987, we assume that all the
Japanese motorcycles of 699 cc or above were imported at the normal tari⁄ rate of 4.4 percent, the
same tari⁄ rate applied to those below 700 cc. Under this counterfactual circumstance, American
and Japanese motorcycle companies are assumed to compete with one another over price; that is,
we compute an equilibrium of the mode by each tri-annual period t, using demand equation, (3) and
the supply equation (4). In this simulation exercises, I assume that all the Japanese motorcycles
were subject to the safeguard tari⁄s, in contrast to the fact that some of the Japanese motorcycles
sold in the U.S. either received the quota-tari⁄rate of 4.4 percent, or escaped the tari⁄altogether if
locally manufactured. Thus, in the counterfactual exercises discussed in this section, we probably
over-estimate the impacts of the motorcycle safeguard policy. On the supply side, we assume
multi-product Bertrand competition when simulating the model.8 Note that the experience with
the simulated no-safegurad situation is allowed to change in the cost function.
In Table 7, we present the simulated prices in comparison with the actual prices by make and
by size of engine displacement. The table indicates that the safeguard tari⁄s would have increased
the prices of Japanese motorcycles of the engine displacement targeted by the safeguard policy.
The prices of Japanese motorcycles with 700 cc or above were a⁄ected directly by the introduction
of the safeguard tari⁄s. The actual prices began 18 percent higher than the simulated prices under
no-safeguard regime in 1983, and the di⁄erences between the actual and simulated prices declined
in general, as the safeguard tari⁄s phased out toward 1987.9 Note that the prices would not
8We ignore the presence of inventory accmulated in the early 1983. Since the inventory did not receive the
safeguard duties, our treatment of the inventory adds another reason why our simulated policy e⁄ect is overstated.
We plan to calculate other modes of ￿rm competition, including collusion among Japanese makers, and collusion in
the U.S. market.
9The e⁄ect on prices appears smaller in 1983 than in 1984, because of the fact that the safeguard was implemented
13have increased by the same magnitude of the safeguard tari⁄ rates, primarily because the own-
price elasticities discussed in the previous section are found elastic. The prices of the small-sized
motorcycles would have been lower by 22 percent.
Prices of Harley-Davidson￿ s in the engine displacement from 700 to 1099 cc was found to have
increased by 12 percent, while those of larger motorcycles was merely two percent. The magnitudes
of the safeguard e⁄ect on Harley-Davidson￿ s prices di⁄er because the cross price elasticities with
Japanese motorcycles of 700cc or above was found higher for the Harley￿ s motorcycles.
Table 8 presents the e⁄ects of safeguard tari⁄s on sales and pro￿ts of both American and
Japanese motorcycle companies. The higher import duties reduced the Japanese sales and pro￿ts
by 15 and 22 percent, respectively. Although, as shown in Figure 1, Harley-Davidson￿ s sales had
rapidly increased since the introduction of the safeguard in 1983, the safeguard tari⁄s contributed
merely 6 percent to Harley￿ s sales and pro￿ts. This simulation result indicates that the e⁄ect
on price of the safeguard duties would not have been accountable for Harley Davidson￿ s recovery.
Instead, the improvement of quality and attributes of Harley￿ s motorcycles would have made a
primary cause of their sucess.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we examined the e⁄ect of U.S. safeguard duties on heavy motorcycles in the period
from 1983 to 1987. When Harley-Davidson sought tari⁄ protection in 1982, the sole surviving
American motorcycle company was on the verge of bankruptcy: they held merely a ￿ve percent of
the the U.S. market, following four Japanese new comers. After receiving the temporary import
relief in 1983 on heavy motorcycle imports, Harly-Davidson￿ s sales drastically recovered. Indeed,
Harley-Davidson recovered so swiftly that it even requested the ￿nal year of tari⁄ protection be
cancelled. It is no surprise that Harley-Davidson motorcycle case has been heralded as a success of
safeguard protection.
This paper performed quantitative analyses to assess the extent to which the motorcycle safe-
guard a⁄ected on Harley-Davidson. The examination of the data cast some doubt on the e⁄ective-
ness of the import relief; Harley-Davidson experienced the increase in both prices and quantities
sold in the safeguard period, while the Japanese companies had their prices increased at much a
slower rate than Harley-Davidson, and their sales quantities substantially decreased in 1983 and
thereafter.
The demand estimates derived from the random-coe¢ cient discrete choice model indicate that
Harley-Davidson￿ s motorcycle characteristics were well perceived by consumers. Based on the
in the second quarter of 1983, and thus its e⁄ect was not fully re￿ ected in the prices of 1983.
14obtained estimates, we conducted simulation exercises to measure the extent to which the safeguard
tari⁄s contributed to the recovery of the American motorcycle company. The simulation results
demonstrated that the safeguard tari⁄s explained merely a six percent of Harley-Davidson￿ s sales
and pro￿t recovery. The ￿nding of this tiny safeguard e⁄ect on Harley￿ s pro￿t and quantities
sold was largely due to our demand estimation results, indicating that the values of cross-price
elasticities of consumer demand between American and Japanese motorcycles were considerably
small. Thus, the tari⁄ increase would have had little e⁄ect on shifting consumers from Japanese
motorcycles to American ones. Our estimation results support the hypothesis that Harley-Davidson
saved itself out of bankruptcy. Indeed, it was around 1983 when Harley-Davidson was known to
have renovated their production system; they implemented both a statistical control system and
a just-in-time inventory program that improved their production e¢ ciency. Harley also created
a new and more reliable engine than the old V-twin engine. Based on the paper￿ s analyses, the
import relief had little to dow with Harley-Davidson recovery in 1983 and thereafter.
A Data Appendix
Motorcycle design di⁄ered according to the type of use for which the vehicle was intended. O⁄-
road machines, used almost extensively for recreation, had more robust frames with higher ground
clearance, studded tires to increase traction in mud and sand, various engine modi￿cations to ensure
maximum pulling power rather than speed, and unmu› ed exhaust to increase power. On-road
machines carried the necessary safety equipment, e.g., lights, rear-view mirrors, signals. They were
designed for high cruising speeds, rider comfort, and good handling at high speeds. Combination
or enduro machines were supposed to serve both functions; some models were designed with a bias
toward on-road use, others toward o⁄-road.
The safeguard implemented in 1983 applied to on-road motorcycles, on which this paper fo-
cused. The motorcycles with the piston displacement of 450 cc or larger are classi￿ed as on-road
motorcycles. The data sources of such motorcycles are described below.
Sales quantity data (i.e., the number of new registrations) are obtained from the ￿Motorcycle
Statistics by Make and Model￿published by R.L. Polk. As far as we searched, this publication is
available only for the period from 1983 to 1987, archived at the Library of Congress, Washington
DC in the United States. This publication lists sales quantity by make and by model.
Motorcycle price and characteristics data are from ￿Motorcycle and Moped Appraisal Guide,￿a
tri-annual magazine published by National Automotive Dealers Association. The data are available
from 1977 to 1987. For the price variable, we employ the prime retail price, known to be re￿ ecting
transaction prices. Listed prices, or manufacturers suggested prices, could be another candidate
for the price variable; however, they never changed their values through our study period.
15The motorcycle population is used in the calculation of the market size, and the income dis-
tribution of motorcycle owners is used in the construction of the income data. Both are obtained
from ￿Motorcycle Statistical Annual￿published by the Motorcycle Industry Council (MIC) in the
1985 issue. The quantity data by make (but not by model) are also available from the MIC in the
period from 1977 to 1995. The data on exchange rate are from International Financial Statistics,
and the values and quantities of U.S. motorcycle imports are available from FT246 published by
U.S. Census Bureau.
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16Sales Price No. Sales Price No.  Total  Sales
( % ) (USD) Models ( % ) (USD) Models (Unit)
1983 72.11 6831 54 27.89 4395 15 26675
1984 66.79 6636 54 33.21 4198 12 26636
1985 71.51 6771 26 28.49 3890 7 27564
1986 76.41 7128 39 23.59 3626 8 29940
1987 72.42 7115 56 27.58 3535 11 33426
Average 71.85 6896 46 28.15 3929 11 28848
Sales Price No. Sales Price No. Sales Price No.  Total  Sales
( % ) (USD) Models ( % ) (USD) Models ( % ) (USD) Models (Unit)
1983 2.64 4628 36 53.98 3187 39 43.38 2139 57 324652
1984 9.31 5089 31 27.74 2743 41 62.95 1970 99 305399
1985 14.60 5136 11 21.68 3011 15 63.72 2052 29 231966
1986 15.18 5347 9 22.77 3263 12 62.05 2161 19 186820
1987 14.50 5500 7 24.59 3355 9 60.91 2287 14 191496
Average 11.25 5140 19 30.15 3112 23 58.60 2122 44 248067
Notes:
  Harley-Davidson made no motorcycle below 700cc in the period discussed in the paper.
  Price is CPI-deflated in the year of 1983.
  Sales are the number of motorcycles newly registered in a particular year, and price is the quantity-
weighted average by the size of engine displacement. The table does not contain police bikes.
TABLE 1




1100cc- 700-1099cc 450-699ccCoef. S. E. Coef. S. E.
SG * year 0.028 
a 0.009 0.104 
a 0.008
SG -0.034 
a 0.009 -0.031 
a 0.009
TD -0.040 
a 0.009 -0.017 
b 0.008
Exchange Rate 0.131 
a 0.023 0.117 
a 0.019
Engine Displacement 0.654 
a 0.018 0.633 
a 0.018
Dry Weight 0.535
a 0.017 0.537 
a 0.016
Age -0.125 
a 0.003 -0.126 
a 0.002
Harley Davidson -0.685
a 0.122 -0.609 
a 0.101
Harley Davidson * Trend 0.037
a 0.002 0.039 
a 0.002
Trend 0.003 








The superscripts, a, b, indicate significance at the 99- 
and 90-confidence levels.
TABLE 2
The Effect of Sageguard on Motorcycle Prices
1-A 2-A
0.907 0.908
5592 5592Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Quantity 637 543 50 2833 2491 2734 57 18660
Price 6223 1295 3238 8328 2672 1184 1070 8306
Cc (1000) 1.256 0.149 0.883 1.340 0.748 0.239 0.447 1.182
Dryweght (1000) 0.596 0.086 0.457 0.761 0.488 0.094 0.297 0.772
Age 13.178 6.003 4.000 44.000 15.349 9.106 1.000 35.000
Tariff 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.163 0.166 0.044 0.494
Number of observations
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Quantity 946 1132 52 7060 1045 1049 50 5246
Price 2934 1149 1351 6393 2688 1094 1186 7188
Cc (1000) 0.828 0.236 0.454 1.286 0.810 0.253 0.448 1.360
Dryweght (1000) 0.512 0.100 0.372 0.840 0.478 0.085 0.342 0.763
Age 16.606 10.870 1.000 49.000 15.858 8.730 2.000 35.000
Tariff 0.195 0.161 0.044 0.494 0.171 0.162 0.044 0.494
Number of observations
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Quantity 1127 1250 64 7096
Price 2750 1020 1270 6332
Cc (1000) 0.812 0.237 0.494 1.294
Dryweght (1000) 0.483 0.086 0.269 0.732
Age 14.435 9.442 1.000 36.000









239 244Variables Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Price -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0006 
a 0.0001 -34.61 
a 10.3450
Engine Displacement -1.49 
a 0.24 -0.44 0.31 -1.43 1.29
Dryweight 2.26 
a 0.76 5.74 
a 1.03 5.92 
a 1.39
Age -0.05 
a 0.00 -0.07 
a 0.01 -0.08 
a 0.01
Period2 0.54 
a 0.07 0.57 
a 0.08 0.54 
a 0.11
Period3 -0.46 
a 0.08 -0.42 
a 0.08 -0.63 
a 0.22
Harley*trend 0.08 
b 0.04 0.34 
a 0.06 0.37 
a 0.06
Trend -0.13 




a 0.27 -7.83 
a 0.31 -6.13 
a 0.57
Engine Displacement -- -- 1.51 
a 0.652
Dryweight -- -- -0.53 1.478
Constant -- -- 0.10 0.981
R
2





The variables of engine displacement and dryweight are divided by 1000.








22.18 (7) 16.38 (7)
- 0.92 0.92
- 91.36 91.36
920 920 920Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Engine displacement 0.99 






a 0.180 1.29 1.290
(Dryweight)
2 -- 9.51 
a 1.947
(Engine displacement)*(Dryweight) -- -9.42 
a 1.726
Learning -7.25 
a 0.819 -7.19 
a 0.795
Exchange rate - - - -
harley 108.45 
a 11.573 106.54 
a 11.214
honda 116.75 
a 12.599 114.64 
a 12.207
kawasaki 108.30 
a 11.642 106.25 
a 11.279
suzuki 106.76 
a 11.473 104.75 
a 11.116
yamaha 110.81
a 11.926 108.77 
a 11.554
harley*trend -0.35 
a 0.038 -0.35 
a 0.037
trend 0.54 












Cost EstimatesHarley-Davidson Japanese with Japanese with Japanese with Japanese with
 450-549cc 550-699cc 700-849cc 850cc-
Harley-Davidson -6.368 0.045 0.062 0.076 0.114
Japanese with 0.083 -10.402 0.148 0.152 0.156
 450-549cc
Japanese with 0.211 0.270 -9.362 0.319 0.359
550-699cc
Japanese with 0.102 0.105 0.129 -9.009 0.181
700-849cc
Japanese with 0.277 0.184 0.242 0.287 -7.852
850cc-
Note: The (i, j) elemnt in the matrix indicates the share weighted average percentage change in market share of 
product i with a $100 increase in the price of j.
TABLE 6
Own and Cross Semi-Elasticities700-1099cc 1100cc- 450-699cc 700-1099cc 1100cc-
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
1983 -0.11 -0.15 -1.01 17.31 19.21
1984 0.18 0.13 0.00 23.03 26.29
1985 0.22 0.00 0.04 15.85 18.13
1986 0.09 0.10 -0.17 11.17 12.91
1987 0.25 0.03 0.03 11.53 12.18
Average 0.12 0.02 -0.22 15.78 17.74
Notes:
  Japanese Makers include Honda, Yamaha, Suzuki, and Kawasaki.
  Each value in the table is calculated by:
  in which, counterfactual prices are obtained by the procedure described in Section 5.
  Harley-Davidson did not manufacture motorcycles with the range between 450 and 699 cc.
100*(Actual Prices - Counterfactual Prices) / Actual Prices
TABLE 7
Comparison between Actual and Counterfactual Prices
Harley-Davidson Japanese Makers
by Make and CCEffects on Harley-Davidson
Actual Simulated Safeguard  Effects Actual Simulated Safeguard  Effects
Sales (Units) Sales (Units) on Sales ( % ) Profit (Million USD) Profit (Million USD) on Profit ( % )
1983 26675 24681 8.08 42.4 39.5 7.48
1984 26636 24688 7.89 41.7 38.5 8.17
1985 27564 26062 5.76 44.9 42.2 6.42
1986 29940 28794 3.98 47.9 46.0 4.12
1987 31413 30393 3.36 47.3 45.7 3.43
Average 5.81 5.92
Effects on Japanese Makers
1983 324652 398971 -18.63 325.1 444.6 -26.87
1984 305399 368480 -17.12 300.7 404.5 -25.66
1985 231966 272085 -14.74 235.7 298.0 -20.89
1986 186820 210737 -11.35 194.1 233.2 -16.78
1987 161626 180993 -10.70 135.6 164.3 -17.44
Average -14.51 -21.53
Note:
Simulated sales and profits are calculated under the assumption that all Japanese motorcycles sold in the U.S. were subject to the normal tariff of 4.4 percent
 in the period of 1983 to 87.
TABLE 8
Effects of Safeguard Tariffs on Sales and ProfitsFigure 1
U.S Motorcycles Market
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